| The Inter-Allied Control had rightly, from its standpoint,
tried for years to make the training in higher staffs so primitive that
there could be no General Staff. They tried in the boldest ways to
discover how General Staff officers were being trained, but we
succeeded in giving nothing away, neither the system nor what was
taught. Seeckt never gave in, for had the General Staff been
destroyed, it would have been difficult to re-create it. Although the
form had to be broken, the content was saved.
In fact, under the pretence of being Departments of Reconstruction, Research, and Culture,
several thousand staff officers in plain clothes and their assistants were held together in
Berlin, thinking deeply about the past and the future.
Rabenau makes an illuminating comment:
Without Seeckt there would today [in 1940in the Palatinate.
General Keitel communicates the facts at 1.45. He drives to the
Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10.15 to give him the old
draft, ?Prepare Case Otto.? 13.00 hours, General K. [Keitel
A.A. Defences of Scapa
Surely it would be better to have a conference as I suggested and talk
matters over round a table than that I should have to prepare a paper and
raise the matter as a Cabinet issue? The squandering of our strength
proceeds in every direction, everyone thinking he is serving the country by
playing for safety locally. Our Army is puny as far as the fighting front is
First Lord to First Sea Lord, Controller, D.C.N.S.,
Secretary and A.C.N.S.
12.I.40.
First Lord to Controller. 13.I.40.
First Lord to Naval Secretary. 14.I.40.
First Lord to First Sea Lord. 16.I.40.
570
concerned; our Air Force is hopelessly inferior to the Germans'; we are not
allowed to do anything to stop them receiving their vital supplies of ore; we
maintain an attitude of complete passivity, dispersing our forces ever more
widely; the Navy demands Scapa and Rosyth both to be kept at the highest
point. Do you realise that perhaps we are heading for defeat? I feel I must
do my duty, even in small things, in trying to secure effective concentration
upon the enemy, and in preventing needless dispersion.
Fleet Air Arm? Estimated Cost During the First Twelve Months of the Year
I have been increasingly disquieted about the demand which the Fleet Air
Arm involves upon British war -making resources. None the less this estimate
is a surprise to me, as I had not conceived how enormous was the charge
involved. I have always been a strong advocate of the Fleet Air Arm, in fact I
drafted for Sir Thomas Inskip the compromise decision to which he
eventually came in 1938. I feel all the more responsible for making sure that
the Fleet Air Arm makes a real contribution to the present war in killing and
defeating Germans.
2. When some years ago the Fleet Air Arm was being discussed, the speed
of carrier-borne and shore-based aircraft was not unequal; but since then
the shore-based development has been such as to make it impossible for
carrier-borne aircraft to compete with shore-based. This left the Fleet Air
Arm the most important duties of reconnaissance in the ocean spaces, of
spotting during an action with surface ships and launching torpedo seaplane
attacks upon them. However, there are very few surface ships of the enemy,
and one can only consider the possible break-out of a German raider or fast
battleship as potential targets. Provision must be made for this; but certainly
it does not justify anything like this immense expenditure.
3. On thfor the 17th and 18th,
and henceforward daily, from all Ministries, including the Service
Departments. These returns will be circulated to heads of all
Departments at the same time as they are sent to me. Thus it will
be possible to see who are doing best. If all returns are not
received on any day from some Departments, those that are
should nevertheless be circulated.
* * * * *
This put everybody on their mettle. Eight of these returns were actually
Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges and General Ismay. 17.IX.40.
Prime Minister to Sir Horace Wilson and Sir Edward Bridges 19.IX.40.
344
furnished. It was amusing to see that the fighting Departments were for some
time in the worst position. Offended and spurred by this implied reproach,
they very quickly took their proper place. The loss of hours in all Departments
was reduced to a fraction. Presently our fighters made daylight attack too
costly to the enemy, and this phase passed away. In spite of the almost
continuous alerts and alarms which were sounded, hardly a single
Government Department was hit during daylight when it was full of people,
nor any loss of life sustained. But how much time might have been wasted in
the functioning of the war machine if the civil and military staffs had shown
any weakness, or been guided up the wrong alley!
As early as September 1, before the heavy night attacks began, I had
addressed the Home Secretary and others.
Air -raid Warnings and Precautions
1. The present system of air-raid warnings was designed to cope
with occasional large mass raids on definite targets, not with
waves coming over several times a day, and still less with
sporadic bombers roaming about at nights. We cannot allow large
parts of the country to be immobilised for hours every day and to
be distracted every night. The enemy must not be permitted to
prejudice our war effort by stopping work in the factories which
he has been unable to destroy.
2. There should be instituted, therefore, a new system of
warnings:
The Alert
The Alarm
The All Clear
The Alert should not interrupt the normal life of the area. People
not engaged on national work could, if they desired, take refuge
or put their children in a place of safety. But in general they
should learn, and they do learn, to adapt themselves to their
dangers and take only such precautions as are compatible with
their duties and imposed by their temperament.
345
3. The air-raid services should be run on an ininforms
Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris; Ribbentrop is
detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office. Fuehrer
wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal
letter is dispatched to Mussolini, and the reasons are developed
which forced the Fuehrer to take action.6
On the following day, March 11, orders were issued by Hitler to the German armed forces
for the military occupation of Austria. ?Operation Otto,? so long studied, so carefully
prepared, began. President Miklas confronted Seyss-Inquart and the Austrian Nazi leaders
in Vienna with firmness throughout a hectic day. The telephone conversation between
Hitler and Prince Philip of Hesse, his special envoy to the Duce, was quoted in evidence at
Nuremberg, and is of interest:
Hesse: I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. The Duce accepted the
whole thing in a very friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had
been informed from Austria, von Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had
then said it [i.e., Italian intervention though progressing
rapidly towards the production stage, will not be available in sufficient
quantities, even if all goes well, for many months to come. We have not
been able so far to give the additional armour protection to our larger ships.
The political situation in the Baltic is as baffling as ever. On the other hand,
the arrival of the Bismarck in September adds greatly to the scale of the
surface resistance to be encountered.
2. But the war may well be raging in 1941, and no one can tell what
opportunities may present themselves then. I wish, therefore, that all the
preparations of various ships and auxiliaries outlined in your table and
marked as ?beneficial? should continue as opportunity offers; that when
ships come into the dockyards for repair or refit, everything should be done
to them which will not delay their return to service. And it would surely be
only common prudence, in view of the attitude of Russia, to go on warning
our destroyers for service in winter seas. I am glad to feel that we are
agreed in this.
* * * * *
Mr. Churchill to First Sea Lord. 15.I.40.
415
So far no ally had espoused our cause. The United States was cooler than in any other
period. I persevered in my correspondence with the President, but with little response. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer groaned about our dwindling dollar resources. We had already
signed a pact of mutual assistance with Turkey, and were considering what aid we could
give her from our narrow margins. The stresses created by the Finnish War had worsened
our relations, already bad, with the Soviets. Any action we might undertake to help the
Finns might lead to war with Russia. The fundamental antagonisms between the Soviet
Government and Nazi Germany did not prevent the Kremlin actively aiding by supplies and
facilities the development of Hitler's power. Communists in France and any that existed in
Britain denounced the ?imperialist-capitalist? war, and did what they could to hamper work
in the munition factories. They certainly exercised a depressing and subversive influence
within the French Army, already wearied by inaction. We continued to court Italy by
civilities and favourable contracts, but we could feel no security, or progress towards
friendship. Count Ciano was polite to our Ambassador. Mussolini stood aloof.
The Italian Dictator was not, however, without his own misgivings. On January 3, he wrote
a revealing letter to Hitler expressing his distaste fown power,
and prevent the infantry from being held up by wire when
attacking the gorges of the forts and batteries. This is a new
feature, and removes one of the very great previous difficulties,
namely, the rapid landing of [ourorder was sent
at 2 A.M. to Calais saying that evacuation was decided in principle,
but this is surely madness. The only effect of evacuating Calais
would be to transfer the forces now blocking it to Dunkirk. Calais
must be held for many reasons, but specially to hold the enemy
on its front. The Admiralty say they are preparing twenty-four
naval twelve-pounders, which with S.A.P.1 will pierce any tank.
Some of these will be ready this evening.
I must know at earliest why Gort gave up Arras, and what
actually he is doing with the rest of his army. Is he still
persevering in Weygand?s plan, or has he become largely
stationary? If the latter, what do you consider the probable
course of events in the next few days, and what course do you
recommend? Clearly, he must not allow himself to be encircled
without fighting a battle. Should he [notno longer that of a line bent or
temporarily broken, but of a besieged fortress.?
As the result of my visit to Paris and the Cabinet discussions I already found it
necessary to pose a general question to my colleagues.
I am very much obliged to you for undertaking to examine
tonight the consequences of the withdrawal of the French
Government from Paris or the fall of that city, as well as the
problems which would arise if it were necessary to withdraw the
B.E.F. from France, either along its communications or by the
Belgian and Channel ports. It is quite understood that in the first
instance this report could be no more than an enumeration of the
main considerations which arise, and which could thereafter be
remitted to the Staffs. I am myself seeing the military authorities
at 6.30.
Prime Minister to Lord President.
17.V.40.
59
* * * * *
The swift fate of Holland was in all our minds. Mr. Eden had already proposed
to the War Cabinet the formation of Local Defence Volunteers, and this plan
was energetically pressed. All over the country, in every town and village,
bands of determined men came together armed with shotguns, sporting rifles,
clubs and spears. From this a vast organisation was soon to spring. But the
need of Regulars was also vital.
I cannot feel that we have enough trustworthy troops in England,
in view of the very large numbers that may be landed from aircarriers
preceded by parachutists. I do not consider this danger is
imminent at the present time, as the great battle in France has
yet to be decided.
I wish the following moves to be considered with a view to
immediate action:
(1) The transports which brought the Australians to Suez
should bring home eight battalions of Regular infantry from
Palestine, properly convoyed, even at some risk, by
whatever route is thought best. I hope it will be possible to
use the Mediterranean.
(2) The Australian fast convoy arrives early in June with 14,000
men.
(3) These ships should be immediately filled with eight
battalions of Territorials and sent to India, where they
should pick up eight [moreto the Cabinet.
The country is your debtor, and of your Ministry.
These wonderful results, achieved under circumstances of
increasing difficulty, make it necessary for me to ask you to
convey to your Department the warmest thanks and
congratulations from His Majesty?s Government.
* * * * *
Throughout the summer and autumn I wished to help the Secretary of State
for War in his conflict with War Office and Army prejudices about the
commandos, or storm troops.
Prime Minister to Lord Beaverbrook.
21.IX.40.
Prime Minister to Lord Beaverbrook.
25.IX.40.
458
I have been thinking over our very informal talk the other night,
and am moved to write to you because I hear that the whole
position of the commandos is being questioned. They have been
told ?no more recruiting? and that their future is in the meltingpot.
I thought, therefore, I might write to let you know how
strongly I feel that the Germans have been right, both in the last
war and in this, in the use they have made of storm troops. In
1918, the infiltrations which were so deadly to us were by storm
troops, and the final defence of Germany in the last four months
of 1918 rested mainly upon brilliantly posted and valiantly fought
machine-gun nests. In this war all these factors are multiplied.
The defeat of France was accomplished by an incredibly small
number of highly equipped ?lite, while the dull mass of the
German Army came on behind, made good the conquest and
occupied it. If we are to have any campaign in 1941, it must be
amphibious in its character, and there will certainly be many
opportunities for minor operations, all of which will depend on
surprise landings of lightly equipped, nimble forces accustomed to
work like packs of hounds instead of being moved about in the
ponderous manner which is appropriate to the regular
formations. These have become so elaborate, so complicated in
their equipment, so vast in their transport, that it is very difficult
to use them in any operations in which time is vital.
For every reason, therefore, we must develop the storm troop or
commando idea. I have asked for five thousand parachutists, and
we must also have at least ten thousand of these small ?bands of
brothers? who will be capable of lightning action. In this way
alone will those positions be secured which afterwards will give
the opportunity for highly trained Regular troops to operate on a
larger scale.
I hope, therefore, that you will let me have an opportunSt. Nazaire, who are
to be sent to their destination without any warship protection of
any kind. If it is held to be a feasible operation to move twelve
thousand men unescorted onto the Irish or British western coasts
in the face of the full British sea-power, can this be reconciled
with the standard of danger-values now adopted in the
Mediterranean?
4. No one can see where or when the main attack on Egypt will
develop. It seems, however, extremely likely that if the Germans
are frustrated in an invasion of Great Britain or do not choose to
attempt it, they will have great need to press and aid the Italians
to the attack of Egypt. The month of September must be
regarded as critical in the extreme.
5. In these circumstances it is very wrong that we should attempt
to send our armoured brigade round the Cape, thus making sure
that during September it can play no part either in the defence of
England or Egypt.
6. I request that the operation of passing at least two M.T. ships
through with the Eastern reinforcements may be re-examined.
The personnel can be distributed in the warships, and it is a
lesser risk, from the point of view of the general war, to pass the
M.T. ships through the Mediterranean than to have the whole
armoured brigade certainly out of action going round the Cape.
So long as the personnel are properly distributed among the
warships, I am prepared to take the full responsibility for the
possible loss of the armoured vehicles.
439
I was not able to induce the Admiralty to send the armoured brigade, or at
least their vehicles, through the Mediterranean. I was both grieved and vexed
at this. Though my friendship for Admiral Pound and confidence in his
judgment were never affected, sharp argument was maintained. The
professional responsibility was his, and no naval officer with whom I ever
worked would run more risks than he. We had gone through a lot together. If
he would not do it, no one else would. If I could not make him, no one else
could. I knew the Admiralty too well to press them or my great friend and
comrade, Pound, or the First Lord, for whom I had high esteem, beyond a
certain point. My relations with the Admiralty were too good to be imperilled
by a formal appeal to the Cabinet against them.
When on August 15, I brought the question before the Cabinet finally I said
that I had hoped to persuade the Admiralty to fit the two armoured regiments
into ?Operation Hats.? If the tank-units proceeded t If you keep on talking this rubbish, saying I?m your wife and what not, just watch me cut your head off.? She raised her saber as she said this.
Yang Guo held his head and jumped to the side and pleaded, ?Miss, I won?t say it anymore.?
The girl said, ?Look at you, even an ugly old hag wouldn?t marry you.? Yang Guo laughed foolishly and didn?t reply.
Now, the sky was dark, the two stood in the unkempt land; they turned around, and saw smoke from cooking rising up from the town and both felt hungry.
The young girl said, ?Sha Dan, go to the market and buy ten buns.?
Yang Guo shook his head and said, ?I won?t go.? The young girl?s face turned angry and she said, ?Why not?? Yang Guo said, ?I won?t go! You are tricking me to go buy some buns so you could sneak off.? The young girl said, ?I said I won?t slip away so I won?t.? Yang Guo shook his head. The girl curled up her fist wanting to hit him but he quickly jumped to the side. The two of them ran around the bull like they were playing hide and seek. The girl was lame and it wasn?t easy for her to move. She saw the boy tripping up in front of her crying and shouting out, yet, although she possessed lightness kung fu, she was still unable to catch up with him.
The girl was furious, she thought about her martial arts, yet for some reason, she had allowed an ugly and smelly country bumpkin Sha Dan to stay on her tail. She had no way to escape, it might be said that she was incompetent. Yang Guo had made himself so much like the character he was supposed to be that when the girl failed three or four times to kill the Sha Dan, she was not suspicious. She followed the main road south and she saw that Yang Guo was holding onto the bull and catching up. She thought that she must find a way to kill him unexpectedly. In the short time it takes to cook rice, the sky had become even darker. She saw an old and run down stone house; it looked abandoned and thought, ?Tonight I?ll sleep here and when that idiot is sleeping in the middle of the night, I?ll kill him with one slash.? She walked towards the house and entered, dust entered her nose, the chairs and tables were broken and it appeared that this house was deserted long ago. She cut some grass and wiped a long table clean; she lay on the table, closed her eyes and rested. She saw that Yang Guo hadn?t followed her, and called out, ?Sha Dan! Sha Dan!? She didn?t hear a reply and thought, ?Could it be that the fool knows that I was going to kill him and left! The aeroplanes and the magnetic ship? the
Borde? will be at work within the next ten days, and we all feel pretty sure
that the danger from magnetic mines will soon be out of the way.
380
We are also studying the possible varying of this form of attack, viz.,
acoustic mines and supersonic mines. Thirty ardent experts are pursuing
these possibilities, but I am not yet able to say that they have found a cure.
It is well to ponder this side of the naval war. In the event a significant proportion of our
whole war effort had to be devoted to combating the mine. A vast output of material and
money was diverted from other tasks, and many thousand men risked their lives night and
day in the minesweepers alone. The peak figure was reached in June, 1944, when nearly
sixty thousand were thus employed. Nothing daunted the ardour of the merchant navy;
and their spirits rose with the deadly complications of the mining attack and our effective
measures for countering it. Their toils and tireless courage were our salvation. The sea
traffic on which we depended for our existence proceeded without interruption.
* * * * *
The first impact of the magnetic mine had stirred me deeply, and apart from all the
protective measures which had been enforced upon us, I sought for a means of retaliation.
My visit to the Rhine on the eve of the war had focused my mental vision upon this
supreme and vital German artery. Even in September, I had raised discussion at the
Admiralty about the launching or dropping of fluvial mines in the Rhine. Considering that
this river was used by the traffic of many neutral nations, we could not, of course, take
action unless and until the Germans had taken the initiative in this form of indiscriminate
warfare against us. Now that they had done so, it seemed to me that the proper retort for
indiscriminate sinkings by mines at the mouths of the British harbours was a similar and if
possible more effective mining attack upon the Rhine.
Accordingly, on November 17, I issued several minutes of which the following gives the
most precise account of the plan:
Controller [and othersYugoslavia, and have
wished to see whether it was a serious attack upon Yugoslavian
independence or merely taking some naval bases in the Adriatic.
However, this situation has changed. Italy is continually
threatening to go to war with England and France, and not by
?the back door.? We are so near a break with Italy on grounds
which have nothing to do with Yugoslavia, that it would seem
that our main aim might well be now to procure this Balkan
mobilisation. Will you think this over?
* * * * *
In spite of the extreme efforts made by the United States, of which Mr. Hull
has given an impressive account in his memoirs,4 nothing could turn Mussolini
from his course. Our preparations to meet the new assault and complication
were well advanced when the moment came. On June 10 at 4.45 P.M. the
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Ambassador that Italy
would consider herself at war with the United Kingdom from 1 P.M. the next
day. A similar communication was made to the French Government. When
Ciano delivered his note to the French Ambassador, M. Fran?ois-Poncet
remarked as he reached the door: ?You too will find the Germans are hard
masters.? The British Ambassador, Sir Percy Loraine, received the
announcement with perfect composure and apparent indifference. He asked
only one question: Was Ciano?s statement early news or was it in fact the
declaration of war? Ciano replied it was the latter. Loraine then made a formal
bow and left the room without another word.5 From his balcony in Rome
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 6.VI.40.
132
Mussolini announced to well-organised crowds that Italy was at war with
France and Britain. It was, as Ciano is said to have apologetically remarked
later on, ?A chance which comes only once in five thousand years. ? Such
chances, though rare, are not necessarily good.
Forthwith the Italians attacked the French troops on the Alpine front and
Great Britain reciprocally declared war on Italy. The five Italian ships detained
at Gibraltar were seized and orders were given to the Navy to intercept and
bring into controlled ports all Italian vessels at sea. On the night of the 12th
our bomber squadrons, after a long flight from England which meant light
loads, dropped their first bombs, upon Turin and Milan. We looked forward,
however, to a much heavier delivery as soon as we could use the French
airfields at Marseilles.
It may be convenient at this point toa principal naval objective. The
laying of a declared minefield, including magnetic mines, off Lulea by British
submarines would be one way. There are others. If Germany can be cut
from all Swedish ore supplies from now onwards till the end of 1940, a blow
will have been struck at her war -making capacity equal to a first-class
victory in the field or from the air, and without any serious sacrifice of life. It
might indeed be immediately decisive.
5. To every blow struck in war there is a counter. If you fire at the enemy he
will fire back. It is most necessary, therefore, to face squarely the counter -
measures which may be taken by Germany, or constrained by her from
Norway or Sweden. As to Norway, there are three pairs of events which are
linked together. First, the Germans, conducting war in a cruel and lawless
manner, have violated the territorial waters of Norway, sinking without
warning or succour a number of British and neutral vessels. To that our
response is to lay the minefields mentioned above. It is suggested that
Norway, by way of protest, may cancel the valuable agreement we have
made with her for chartering her tankers and other ship ping. But then she
would lose the extremely profitable bargain she has made with us, and this
shipping would become valueless to her in view of our contraband control.
Her ships would be idle, and her owners impoverished. It would not be in
Norwegian interests for her Government to take this step; and interest is a
powerful factor. Thirdly, Norway could retaliate by refusing to export to us
the aluminium and other war materials which are important to the Air
Ministry and the Ministry of Supply. But here again her interests would
suffer. Not only would she not receive the valuable gains which this trade
brings her, but Great Britain, by denying her bauxite and other indispensable
raw materials, could bring the whole industry of Norway, centring upon Oslo
and Bergen, to a complete standstill. In short, Norway, by retaliating against
us, would be involved in economic and industrial ruin.
6. Norwegian sympathies are on our side, and her future independence from
German overlordship hangs upon the victory of the Allies. It is not
reasonable to suppose that she will take either of the counter -measures
mentioned above (although she may threaten them), unless she is
compelled to do so by German brute force.
7. This will certainly be applied to her anyway, and whatever we do, if
GermanThe Dominions have been kept fully informed.
This was no time for recriminations about the past. The guarantee to Poland was supported
by the leaders of all parties and groups in the House. ?God helping, we can do no other,?
was what I said. At the point we had reached, it was a necessary action. But no one who
understood the situation could doubt that it meant in all human probability a major war in
which we should be involved.
* * * * *
In this sad tale of chanel cambon large tote bag wrong judgments formed by well-meaning and capable people, we now
reach our climax. That we should all have come to this pass makes those responsible,
however honourable their motives, blameworthy before history. Look back and see what
we had successively accepted or thrown away: a Germany disarmed by solemn treaty; a
Germany rearmed in violation of a solemn treaty; air superiority or even air parity cast
away; the Rhineland forcibly occupied and the Siegfried Line built or building; the Berlin -
Rome Axis established; Austria devoured and digested by the Reich; Czechoslovakia
deserted and ruined by the Munich Pact; its fortress line in German hands; its mighty
arsenal of Skoda henceforward making munitions for the German armies; President
Roosevelt's effort to stabilise or bring to a head the European situation by the intervention
of the United States waved aside with one hand, and Soviet Russia's undoubted willingness
to join the Western Powers and go all lengths to save Czechoslovakia ignored on the other;
the services of thirty-five Czech divisions against the still unripened German Army cast
away, when Great Britain could herself supply only two to strengthen the front in France?
all gone with the wind.
And now, when every one of these aids and advantages has been squandered and thrown
away, Great Britain advances, leading France by the hand, to guarantee the integrity of
Poland? of that very Poland which with hyena appetite had only six months before joined in
the pillage and destruction of the Czechoslovak State. There was sense in fighting for
Czechoslovakia in 1938 when the German Army could scarcely put half a dozen trained
263
divisions on the Western Front, when the French with nearly sixty or seventy divisions could
most certainly have rolled forward across the Rhine or into the Ruhr. But this had been
judged unreasonable, rash, below the level of modern intellectual thought and morality. Yet
now at last the two Western Democracies declared themselves readyat
this stage. The Navy is responsible for preventing any sea-borne
expedition attacking our West African colonies. As to the air
attack, if the French bomb Freetown or Bathurst, we will bomb
Vichy. I do not think this will happen.
[In dispatching a Blenheim squadron to Greece? i.e.,
troops, A.A. guns, coast defence guns, lights, wireless, R.D.F.,
nets, mines, preparation of aerodromes, etc.?
Prime Minister to First Lord, First Sea Lord, and General Ismay, for
C.O.S. Committee. C.A.S. to see.
30.XI.40.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
1.XII.40.
542
I hope to be assured that many hundreds of Cretans are working
at strengthening the defences and lengthening and improving the
aerodromes.
The continued retreat of the Italians in Albania, and the reports
which we have received today of difficulties of feeding and
watering their forces in the Libyan Desert, together with other
reports of aircraft being moved back to Tripoli to be safer from
our attacks, combined with safe arrival at Takoradi of thirty-three
Hurricanes with first-class pilots, all constitute new facts entitling
us to take a more confident view of the situation, which should
be communicated to General Wavell.
The enormous advantage of being able, once an enemy is on the
run, to pull supplies and fighting troops forward eighty miles in a
night by sea, and bring fresh troops up to the advance guard, is
very rarely offered in war. General Wavell?s reply to my telegram
does not seem to take any account of this, and, considering how
much we have ourselves at stake, I do not think we should be
doing our duty if we did not furnish him with the results of our
Staff study. It is a crime to have amphibious power and leave it
unused. Therefore, I wish the study, if favourable, to be
telegraphed. It must, however, be ready by the 3d at latest.
I add the following general observation: The fact that we now
have established ourselves at Suda Bay entitles us to feel much
easier about Malta. While the Fleet is or may be at Suda, it will be
most unlikely that any large landing will be attempted at Malta,
which we have already reinforced by tanks and guns from Middle
East? . The possession of Suda Bay has made an enormous
change in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The story of Suda Bay is sad. The tragedy was not reached until 1941. I
believe I had as much direct control over the conduct of the war as any public
man had in any country at this time. The knowledge I possessed, the fidelity
General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee.
1.XII.40.
543
and active aid of the War Cabinet, the loyalty of all my colleagues, the evergrowing
efficiency of our war machine, all enabled an intense focusing of
constitutional authority to be achieved. Yet how far short was t If the result is
satisfactory, people will say that it is not genuine. If it is bad, the situation of the
Government will be unbearable; and if it is indecisive, then it is worthless.? But Schuschnigg
was determined. On March 9, he announced officially that a plebiscite would be held
throughout Austria on the following Sunday, March 13.
At first nothing happened. Seyss-Inquart seemed to accept the idea without demur. At
5.30, however, on the morning of March 11, Schuschnigg was rung up on the telephone
from Police Headquarters in Vienna. He was told: ?The German frontier at Salzburg was
closed an hour ago. The German customs officials have been withdrawn. Railway
communications have been cut.? The next message to reach the Austrian Chancellor was
from his consul-general in Munich saying that the German army corps there had been
mobilised: supposed destination? Austria!
Later in the morning, Seyss-Inquart came to announce that Goering had just telephoned to
him that the plebiscite must be called off within an hour. If no reply was received within
that time Goering would assume that Seyss-Inquart had been hindered from telephoning,
and would act accordingly. After being informed by responsible officials that the police and
army were not entirely reliable, Schuschnigg informed Seyss-Inquart that the plebiscite
would be postponed. A quarter of an hour later, the latter returned with a reply from
Goering scribbled on a message-pad:
The situation can only be saved if the Chancellor resigns
immediately and if within two hours Doctor Seyss-Inquart is
nominated Chancellor. If nothing is done within this period, the
German invasion of Austria will follow.5
Schuschnigg waited on President Miklas to tender his resignation. While in the President's
203
room, he received a deciphered message from the Italian Government that they could offer
no counsel. The old President was obstinate: ?So in the decisive hour I am left alone.? He
steadfastly refused to nominate a Nazi Chancellor. He was determined to force the
Germans into a shameful and violent deed. But for this they were well prepared. A vivid
account of the German reaction is found again in Jodl's diary for March 10:
By surprise and without consulting his Ministers, von Schuschnigg
ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, March 13, which should bring a
strong majority for the legitimate party in the absence of plan or
preparation. The Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. This very
n
One of the most fascinating works of history ever written, Winston Churchill's monumental
The Second World War is a six -volume account of the struggle of the Allied powers in
Europe against Germany and the Axis. Told through the eyes of British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill, The Second World War is also the story of one nation's singular, heroic
role in the fight against tyranny. Pride and patriotism are evident everywhere in Churchill's
dramatic account and for good reason. Having learned a lesson at Munich that they would
never forget, the British refused to make peace with Hitler, defying him even after France
had fallen and after it seemed as though the Nazis were unstoppable. Churchill remained
unbowed throughout, as did the people of Britain in whose determination and courage he
placed his confidence.
Patriotic as Churchill was, he managed to maintain a balanced impartiality in his description
of the war. What is perhaps most interesting, and what lends the work its tension and
emotion, is Churchill's inclusion of a significant amount of primary material. We hear his
retrospective analysis of the war, to be sure; but we are also presented with memos,
letters, orders, speeches, and telegrams that give a day-by-day account of the reactionsboth
mistaken and justified-to the unfolding drama. Strategies and counterstrategies
develop to respond to Hitler's ruthless conquest of Europe, his planned invasion of England,
and his treacherous assault on Russia. It is a mesmerizing account of the crucial decisions
that have to be made with imperfect knowledge and an awareness that the fate of the
world hangs in the balance.
The Gathering Storm is the first volume of The Second World War. In some ways a
continuation of The World Crisis, Churchill's history of World War I, The Gathering Storm is
his attempt to come to grips with the terrible circumstances that gave rise to Nazi Germany
and a second, even more destructive world conflict. As he notes in his preface, Churchill
was perhaps the only person who held such prominent positions of power in both world
wars, so he is remarkably well-qualified to tell the tragic story of war to peace to war. The
Gathering Storm considers the stipulations and consequences of the Treaty of Versailles,
the rise of Adolf Hitler, the capitulation at Munich and the entry of the British into the war.
The volume is pervaded by Churchill's somber feeling that the Second World War was
largely a se is agreeable, but we prefer that it should be on
392
lease indefinitely and not sale. It is understood that this will
enable us to secure destroyers and flying-boats at once. You
should let Colonel Knox and others know that a request on these
lines will be agreeable to us? . It is, as you say, vital to settle
quickly. Now is the time when we want the destroyers. We can fit
them with Asdics in about ten days from the time they are in our
hands, all preparations having been made. We should also be
prepared to give a number of Asdics sets to the United States
Navy and assist in their installation and explain their working. Go
ahead on these lines full steam.
Profound and anxious consultations had taken place at Washington, and in the
first week of August the suggestion was made to us through Lord Lothian that
the fifty old but reconditioned American destroyers which lay in the east coast
Navy yards might be traded off. to us in exchange for a series of bases in the
West Indian islands, and also Bermuda. There was, of course, no comparison
between the intrinsic value of these antiquated and inefficient craft and the
immense permanent strategic security afforded to the United States by the
enjoyment of the island bases. But the threatened invasion, the importance of
numbers in the Narrow Seas, made our need clamant. Moreover, the strategic
value of these islands counted only against the United States. They were, in
the old days, the stepping-stone by which America could be attacked from
Europe or from England. Now, with air power, it was all the more important
for American safety that they should be in friendly hands, or in their own. But
the friendly hands might fail in the convulsive battle now beginning for the life
of Britain. Believing, as I have always done, that the survival of Britain is
bound up with the survival of the United States, it seemed to me and to my
colleagues that it was an actual advantage to have these bases in American
hands. 1 therefore did not look upon the question from any narrow British
point of view.
There was another reason, wider and more powerful than either our need for
the destroyers or the American need for the bases. The transfer to Great
Britain of fifty American warships was a decidedly unneutral act by the United
States. It would, according to all the standards of history, have justified the
German Government in declaring war upon them. The President judged that
there was no danger, anstandard
and accepted parity with America. How about the Army? How about the air
force? For the land and air defence forces England needs above all men, not
merely money, but also the lives of her citizens for Empire defence. Indeed,
of the eleven thousand men needed for the new air programme, seven
thousand are lacking. Again, the small Regular Army shows a large
deficiency, about one whole division, and the Territorial Army (a sort of
Sunday-School for amateur soldiers) is so far below its authorised numbers
that it cannot in any way be considered an effective combatant force. Mr.
Baldwin himself said a short time ago that he had no intention of changing
the system of recruiting by the introduction of conscription.
144
A policy which seeks to achieve success by postponing decisions can today
hardly hope to resist the whirlwind which is shaking Europe and indeed the
whole world. Few are the men who, upon national and not upon party
grounds, rage against the spinelessness and ambiguous attitude of the
Government, and hold them responsible for the dangers into which the
Empire is being driven all unaware. The masses seem to agree with the
Government that the situation will improve by marking time, and that by
means of small adjustments and carefully thought -out manoeuvres the
balance can once again be rectified.
Today all Abyssinia is irrevocably, fully, and finally Italian alone. This being
so, neither Geneva nor London can have any doubt that only the use of
extraordinary force can drive the Italians out of Abyssinia. But neither the
power nor the courage to use force is at hand.
All this was only too true. His Majesty's Government had imprudently advanced to
champion a great world cause. They had led fifty nations forward with much brave
language. Confronted with brute facts Mr. Baldwin had recoiled. Their policy had for a long
time been designed to give satisfaction to powerful elements of opinion at home rather
than to seek the realities of the European situation. By estranging Italy they had upset the
whole balance of Europe and gained nothing for Abyssinia. They had led the League of
Nations into an utter fiasco, most damaging if not fatally injurious to its effective life as an
institution.
145
A New Atmosphere in Britain ? Hitler Free to Strike ? Ratification of the Franco -Soviet Pact
? The Rhineland and the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno ? Hitler Reoccupies the
Rhineland, March 7 ? French Hesitation ? Flamust work so closely together, I hope you will not find it inconvenient to
occupy once again your old quarters which we both know so well in Number
11.? 1 I added:
I do not think there is any necessity for a Cabinet today, as the
Armies and other Services are fighting in accordance with
prearranged plans. I should be very glad, however, if you and
Edward [Halifaxbe examined this afternoon, and Admiralty be consulted,
and report to me on relative times and safety. The Australians
can be left in Palestine for the moment, but the High
Commissioner, like others, must conform to the supreme
requirements of the State.
Admiralty should say whether it would be possible to pick these
men up at the Cape in the big liners for extra speed.
What measures have been taken to seize all Italian ships at the
moment of war? How many are there in British ports, and what
can be done about them on the seas or in foreign ports? Will you
kindly pass this to the proper Department immediately.
At the Supreme War Council in Paris on May 31, which has already been
described, it was agreed that the Allies should undertake offensive operations
against selected objectives in Italy at the earliest possible moment and that
Prime Minister to General Ismay (and others).
29.V.40.
Prime Minister to First Lord of the Admiralty
30.V.40.
130
the French and British naval and air staffs should concert their plans. We had
also agreed that in the event of Italian aggression against Greece, of which
there were indications, we should make sure that Crete did not fall into enemy
hands. I pursued the same theme in my minutes.
It is of the utmost importance, in view of the [possibleRegular troops out [of India
fitted for wire-cutting in its bow. By means of a drawbridge or
shelving bow [the tankshas become less
important now that the Germans have control of all the French
and Belgian orefields. We must look to the Mediterranean for
action.
You were going to let me have your plan for exchanging
destroyers of more endurance with the Mediterranean flotilla.
Could I have this with dates?
To this Admiral Pound replied through the First Lord the same day:
We have now gained experience of the air conditions in the
Western Mediterranean and as soon as the present operation on
which the Eastern Fleet is employed is completed, we shall know
pretty well what we are faced with in the Eastern Mediterranean.
There is no doubt that both Force H and the Eastern
Mediterranean Fleet work under a grave disadvantage inasmuch
as it is not possible to give them fighter protection, as we do in
the North Sea when ships are in the bombing area.
At the moment we are faced with the immediate problem of
getting aircraft and A-A guns to Malta, and aircraft to Alexandria.
I am not at all certain that the risk of passing a ship with all these
available stores through the Mediterranean is not too great, and
that it might not be better to accept the delay of sending her
round the Cape.
There is also the question of Illustrious to be considered, but this
need not be settled immediately as she must first come home to
embark a full complement of Fulmar fighters.
Arrangements arc being made to replace some of the destroyers
433
at Gibraltar by others with longer endurance, but the date on
which they leave will probably be dependent on the escorting of
the ship I have referred to above to Gibraltar.
1. It is now three weeks since I vetoed the proposal to evacuate
the Eastern Mediterranean and bring Admiral Cunningham?s fleet
to Gibraltar. I hope there will be no return to that project. Anyone
can see the risk from air attack which we run in the Central
Mediterranean. From time to time and for sufficient objects this
risk will have to be faced. Warships are meant to go under fire.
Our position would be very different if I had been assisted in my
wish in October of last year to reconstruct the Royal Sovereign
class with heavy anti-aircraft armour on their decks at a cost to
their speed through increased bulging. The difficulties which were
presented at every stage were such as to destroy this proposal,
and we are no further on than we were a year ago. If we had the
Royal Sovereigns armoured, and their guns cocked up, or some
of them, we could a and especially to the one that on September 1 you
had over a thousand unserviceable trainer aircraft? I have long
suspected that the inefficiency which formerly ruled in the A.S.U.s
and left us with only forty-five airplanes when the new
Government was formed, as against about one thousand two
hundred now, was reproduced in all the trainer establishments
and communication flights and that a great mass of airplanes
were kept in an unserviceable state, and I remember particularly
the statement of one of your high officers that the Training
Command worked on a basis of fifty per cent unserviceable. Who
is responsible for repair and training establishments? If I were
you, I should throw the whole business of repair on to M.A.P.,
and then you would be able to criticise them for any
(Action this day.)
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air. 14.XII.40.
718
shortcomings.
See also the figures of how repaired aircraft and engines have
increased since the change was made.
I recur to the point I made to you yesterday when you sent me
your letter to M.A.P. The Air Ministry?s view is that the Germans
have nearly 6000 airplanes in front-line action, and we have
about 2000. Air Ministry also believe that the German output is
1800 a month, out of which they provide only 400 for training
establishments, while we, out of 1400 output, provide also 400.
How do you, then, explain that the Germans are able to keep
three times our establishment in front-line action with only an
equal monthly subscription of trainer aircraft? Apparently, on your
figures, which I may say I do not accept (except for controversial
purposes), the Germans can keep three times as large a force in
action as you can for the same number of trainer planes. I know
that you will rightly say you are preparing for the expansion of
the future, but they have to keep going on a threefold scale, and
expand as well.
I await with keen interest further developments of your
controversy.
It is a magnificent achievement 23 in the teeth of the bombing.
Quite apart from new production, the repaired aircraft has been
your own creation. We now have 1200 in the A.S.U.?s, which is a
great comfort. Dispersion has greatly hampered you, but was
absolutely necessary as an insurance to spread the risk.
In addition, you have not confined yourself to mere numbers,
but, on the contrary, have pushed hard into quality.
The reason why there is this crabbing, as at A,24 is of course the
was the middle of April, the Soviet Government entered
into negotiations with the British and French Governments about the
necessary measures to be taken. The negotiations started then are not yet
concluded. It became clear some time ago that if there was any real desire
to create an efficient front of peaceable countries against the advance of
aggression, the following minimum conditions were imperative:
The conclusion between Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. of an
effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression, of an exclusively
defensive character.
A guarantee on the part of Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. of the
states of Central and Eastern Europe, including without exception all the
European countries bordering on the U.S.S.R., against an attack by
aggressors.
The conclusion between Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. of a definite
agreement on the forms and extent of the immediate and effective
assistance to be rendered to one another and to the guaranteed states in
the event of an attack by aggressors.
The negotiations had come to a seemingly unbreakable deadlock. The Polish and Rumanian
Governments, while accepting the British guarantee, were not prepared to accept a similar
undertaking in the same form from the Russian Government. A similar attitude prevailed in
another vital strategic quarter? the Baltic States. The Soviet Government made it clear that
they would only adhere to a pact of mutual assistance if Finland and the Baltic States were
included in a general guarantee. All four countries now refused, and perhaps in their terror
would for a long time have refused, such a condition. Finland and Esthonia even asserted
that they would consider a guarantee extended to them without their assent as an act of
aggression. On the same day, May 31, Esthonia and Latvia signed non-aggression pacts
with Germany. Thus Hitler penetrated with ease into the frail defences of the tardy,
irresolute coalition against him.
288
The Threat to Danzig ? General Gamelin Invites Me to Visit the Rhine Front ? A Tour with
General Georges ? Some Impressions ? French Acceptance of the Defensive ? The
Position of Atomic Research ? My Note on Air Defence ? Renewed Efforts to Agree with
Soviet Russia ? Polish Obstruction ? The Military Conversations in Moscow ? Stalin's
Account to Me in 1942 ? A Record in Deceit ? Ribbentrop Invited to Moscow ? The
Russo-German Non-Aggression Treaty ? The News Breaks upon the Worlcan
be spared without prejudice to the Libyan pursuit battle. The
Dodecanese will not get harder for a little waiting. But neither of
them ought to detract from the supreme task of inflicting further
defeats upon the main Italian army. I cannot, of course, pretend
to judge special conditions from here, but Napoleon?s maxim,
?Frappez la masse et tout le reste vient par surcroit,? seems to
ring in one?s ears. I must recur to the suggestion made in my
previous telegram about amphibious operations and landings
behind the enemy?s front to cut off hostile detachments and to
carry forward supplies and troops by sea.
Pray convey my compliments and congratulations to Longmore
on his magnificent handling of the R.A.F. and fine co -operation
with the Army. I hope most of the new Hurricanes have reached
him safely. Tell him we are filling up Furious again with another
even larger packet of flyables from Takoradi. He will also get
those that are being carried through in [Operationstrength against our
undefended island and destroy our means of future production by
daylight attack. The classical principles of war which you mention
are in this case modified by the actual quantitative data. I see
only one way through now, to wit, that Hitler should attack this
country, and in so doing break his air weapon. If this happens, he
will be left to face the winter with Europe writhing under his heel,
and probably with the United States against him after the
presidential election is over.
Am most grateful to you for cable. Please always give me your
counsel, my old and valiant friend.
* * * * *
Apart from our last twenty-five Fighter Squadrons, on which we were
adamant, we regarded the duty of sending aid to the French Army as
paramount. The movement of the 52d Division to France, under previous
orders, was due to begin on June 7. These orders were confirmed. The 3d
Division, under General Montgomery, was put first in equipment and assigned
to France. The leading division of the Canadian Army, which had concentrated
in England early in the year and was well armed, was directed, with the full
assent of the Dominion Government, to Brest to begin arriving there on June
11 for what might by this time already be deemed a forlorn hope. The two
French light divisions evacuated from Norway were also sent home, together
with all the French units and individuals we had carried away from Dunkirk.
That we should have sent our only two formed divisions, the 52d Lowland
Division and the 1st Canadian Division, over to our failing French ally in this
mortal crisis, when the whole fury of Germany must soon fall upon us, must
be set to our credit against the very limited forces we had been able to put in
150
France in the first eight months of war. Looking back on it, I wonder how,
when we were resolved to continue the war to the death, and under the
threat of invasion, and France was evidently falling, we had the nerve to strip
ourselves of the remaining effective military formations we possessed. This
was only possible because we understood the difficulties of the Channel
crossing without the command of the sea or the air, or the necessary landing
craft.
* * * * *
We had still in France, behind the Somme, the 51st Highland Division, which
had been withdrawn from the Maginot Line and was in good condition, and
the 52d Lowland Division, which was arriving in Normandy. There was also
our 1st (and only) Armoured Division, le It can hardly be
argued that we can go on paying them till our last gasp. Surely
we ought to use this money to build more ships or buy more from
the United States in view of the heavy sinkings off the Bloody
Foreland.
Pray let me know how these subsidies could be terminated, and
what retaliatory measures could be new prada replica handbags taken in the financial sphere
by the Irish, observing that we are not afraid of their cutting off
our food, as it would save us the enormous mass of fertilisers and
feeding-stuffs we have to carry into Ireland through the De
Valera-aided German blockade. Do not assemble all the pros and
cons for the moment, but show what we could do financially and
what would happen. I should be glad to know about this
tomorrow.
I gave you and each of the C.O.S. a copy of the Irish paper. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer?s comments are also favourable, and
there is no doubt subsidies can be withdrawn at very short
notice.
We must now consider the military reaction. Suppose they invited
the Germans into their ports, they would divide their people, and
we should endeavour to stop the Germans. They would seek to
be neutral and would bring the war upon themselves. If they
withdrew the various cable and watching facilities they have,
what would this amount to, observing that we could suspend all
connections between England and Southern Ireland? Suppose
they let German U-boats come in to refresh in west coast ports of
Ireland, would this be serious, observing that U-boats have a
radius of nearly thirty days, and that the limiting factor is desire
of crews to get home and need of refit, rather than need of
refuelling and provisioning? Pray let me have your observations
on these and other points which may occur to you.
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. 3.XII.40.
600
I thought it well to try to bring the President along in this policy.
North Atlantic transport remains the prime anxiety. Undoubtedly,
Hitler will augment his U-boat and air attack on shipping and
operate ever farther into the ocean. Now that we are denied the
use of Irish ports and airfields, our difficulties strain our flotillas to
the utmost limit. We have so far only been able to bring a very
few of your fifty destroyers into action on account of the many
defects which they naturally develop when exposed to Atlantic
weather after having been laid up so long. I am arranging to
have a very full technical account prepared of renovations and
improgood troops should be directed upon Narvik forthwith, and should
reach there by the end of the first week in May at latest. The orders for this
should be given now, as nothing will be easier than to divert the troops if in
the meanwhile the situation is cleared up. It would be a great administrative
advantage if these troops were British, but if this cannot be managed for
any reason, could not the leading brigade of the Second French Light
Division be directed upon Narvik? There ought to be no undue danger in
bringing a big ship into Skjel Fiord or thereabouts.
3. I should be very glad if the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff could consult with
an officer of equal standing in the War Office upon how this need can be
met, together with ships and times. Failure to take Narvik will be a major
disaster, and will carry with it the control by Germany of the ore-field.
The general position as it was viewed at this moment cannot be better stated than in a
paper written by General Ismay on April 21.
The object of operations at Narvik is to capture the town and obtain
possession of the railway to the Swedish frontier. We should then be in a
position to put a force, if necessary, into the Gullivare ore-fields, the
possession of which is the main objective of the whole of the operations in
Scandinavia.
As soon as the ice melts in Lulea in about a month's time, we must expect
that the Germans will obtain, by threats or force, a passage for their troops
in order that they themselves may secure Gullivare and perhaps go forward
and reinforce their troops at Narvik. It is, therefore, essential that Narvik
should be liquidated in about a month.
The object of operations in the Trondheim area is to capture Trondheim, and
thereby obtain a base for further operations in Central Norway, and Sweden
if necessary. Landings have been made at Namsos on the north of
Trondheim and Andalsnes on the south. The intention is that the Namsos
force will establish itself astride the railway running eastward from
Trondheim, thus encircling the Germans there on the east and northeast.
The force landed at Andalsnes has as its first role the occupation of a
475
defensive position, in co-operation with the Norwegians at Lillehammer, to
block any reinforcement of Trondheim from the main German landing at
Oslo. The road and railways between Oslo and Trondheim have both to be
covered. When this has been achieved, some troops will work northward
and bring pressure to bea
five seconds? ten seconds? twenty seconds. Then came a shattering
explosion, and a great pillar of water rose in the darkness. Prien
waited some minutes to fire another salvo. Tubes ready. Fire. The
torpedoes hit amidships, and there followed a series of crashing
explosions. H.M.S. Royal Oak sank, with the loss of 786 officers and
men, including Rear-Admiral H. E. C. Blagrove [Rear-Admiral Second
Battle Squadronhave you that Southern Ireland, or the
Irish Republic as they claim to be, will not declare neutrality if we
are engaged in war with some powerful nation? The first step
certainly which such an enemy would take would be to offer
complete immunity of every kind to Southern Ireland if she would
remain neutral. You cannot exclude this possibility of neutrality as
being one which may come within the immediate sphere of our
experience. The ports may be denied us in the hour of need, and we
may be hampered in the gravest manner in protecting the British
population from privation and even starvation. Who would wish to
put his head in such a noose? Is there any other country in the
world where such a step would even have been contemplated? It
would be an easy step for a Dublin Government to deny the ports to
us once we have gone. The cannon are there, the mines will be
there. But more important for this purpose, the juridical right will be
there. You had the rights; you have ceded them; you hope in their
place to have good will strong enough to endure tribulation for your
sake. Suppose you have it not. It will be no use saying, ?then we will
retake the ports.? You will have no right to do so. To violate Irish
neutrality should it be declared at the moment of a Great War may
put you out of court in the opinion of the world, and may vitiate the
cause by which you may be involved in war. You are casting away
real and important means of security and survival for vain shadows
and for ease.
211
The comment of The Times newspaper was illuminating:
The agreement on defence releases the Government of the United
Kingdom from the articles of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, by
which they assumed the onerous and delicate task of defending the
fortified harbours of Cork, Berehaven, and Lough Swilly in the event
of war.
Further releases might have been obtained by handing over Gibraltar to Spain and Malta to
Italy. Neither touched the actual existence of our population more directly.
With that I leave this lamentable and amazing episode.
212
An Unlikely Historical Controversy ? Hitler's Next Objective ? ?No Evil Intentions Towards
Czechoslovakia? ? M. Blum's Pledge ? My Visit to Paris, March, 1938 ? M. Daladier
Succeeds M. Blum ? The Anglo-Italian Pact ? An Interview with the Sudeten Leader ?
Misgivings and Reluctance of the German Generals ? The Relations of Soviet Russia with
Czechoslovakia ? Stalin and Benes ? Plot and Purge in Russia Air
attack on the Fleet at Alexandria is not necessarily less effective
from one hundred and twenty miles distance than from twenty
miles, since aeroplanes often fly at three hundred miles per hour
and have ample endurance. In practice it is usually thought
Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord.
27.V1II.40.
668
better to hold aerodromes a little back of the actual fighting line.
They do not move forward concurrently with the fronts of armies.
Everyone here understands the grievous consequence of the fall
of Alexandria, and that it would probably entail the Fleet leaving
the Mediterranean. If, however, you have any helpful suggestion
to make for the more effective defence of Mersa Matruh or of any
positions in advance of it, I should be obliged if you would tell
me.
Now that the long nights are approaching, the question of the
blackout must be reviewed. I am in favour of a policy, not of
black-out but of blnckable -out. For this purpose a considerable
system of auxiliary electric street-lighting must be worked out.
The whole of the centre of London, now lighted by incandescent
gas, must be given priority. The best methods in the centres of
other great cities must also be studied and local schemes must be
examined. Thus the lights can be switched down and up and
finally out on an air-raid warning being given. The lights
themselves should not be of a too brilliant character. The
subdued lighting of shop windows must also be studied with a
view to extending the facilities given last Christmas on a
permanent basis. Where factories are allowed to continue
working at night in spite of the black-out, there can be no
objection to extending blackable-out lighting to the surrounding
districts, thus tending to make the target less defined.
Consideration should also be given to decoy lighting |
| 